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Chaps, as promised in another thread, here is the projected 3-year financial model (attached document) which should make a lot of people happy and set the record straight on a number of items. These figures (especially relating to broadcast revenues) come from a number of reputable sources including the club accounts itself, the football league, and the premier league.
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In the last set of published accounts (season 16/17), I noted that QPR had taken advantage of section 408 of the Companies Act 2006, and chosen not to publish its full statement of profit and loss. Perhaps due to on-going FFP negotiations, or be it to serve as a competitive advantage from a negotiating standpoint (player transfers, wages etc), or something else entirely.
EBITDA / Full Profit & Loss / & FFP
In any case, I am therefore loathe to publish the full analysis, specifically player trading and non-cash items (player amortization, player trading profit/loss, financial loans, interest payments), which are needed for FFP calculations. However, note that we are inside of FFP rules, with our third-year (17/18) likely to post a loss of in the region of 10m, which is inside the 13m yearly maximum.
Note: EBITDA - Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization is a primary indicator of financial health and business fundamentals.
Player Amortization / Transfers (Relative to FFP)
Note that Amortization will be significantly down on previous years (in 17/18), and in continuing years, as we are not buying assets any longer (transfer fees) which depreciate (amortize) over their duration at the club. It means we are less reliant on player sales (trading profit), to offset this negative on the P&L account – something which has served us well in the previous 2 years (15/16, and 16/17), but is not as significant going forward.
Outlook
The outlook in the “post-parachute era” looks positive, contrary to the doom and gloom that often goes hand in hand with such discussions. Whilst on track to post a circa 6.7m loss (i.e. nothing like the scaremongering figures rumoured amongst our fan base), we may at such point in time have a number of sellable assets (2 years from now), and a number of replacement assets on the academy production line, to create a fully sustainable business model.
Or, alternatively, our owners may bankroll this amount and see it as an “on-going investment” in playing staff (i.e. covering some of their wages), in order to reach the promised land, and by virtue, get a whole load of their money back. Either way, it is manageable and we are rapidly returning to financial health, which in turn, may well be attracting outside investment. I’ll post more on this related topic, if there is interest at a later date.
Comments
In the last set of published accounts (season 16/17), I noted that QPR had taken advantage of section 408 of the Companies Act 2006, and chosen not to publish its full statement of profit and loss. Perhaps due to on-going FFP negotiations, or be it to serve as a competitive advantage from a negotiating standpoint (player transfers, wages etc), or something else entirely.
EBITDA / Full Profit & Loss / & FFP
In any case, I am therefore loathe to publish the full analysis, specifically player trading and non-cash items (player amortization, player trading profit/loss, financial loans, interest payments), which are needed for FFP calculations. However, note that we are inside of FFP rules, with our third-year (17/18) likely to post a loss of in the region of 10m, which is inside the 13m yearly maximum.
Note: EBITDA - Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization is a primary indicator of financial health and business fundamentals.
Player Amortization / Transfers (Relative to FFP)
Note that Amortization will be significantly down on previous years (in 17/18), and in continuing years, as we are not buying assets any longer (transfer fees) which depreciate (amortize) over their duration at the club. It means we are less reliant on player sales (trading profit), to offset this negative on the P&L account – something which has served us well in the previous 2 years (15/16, and 16/17), but is not as significant going forward.
Outlook
The outlook in the “post-parachute era” looks positive, contrary to the doom and gloom that often goes hand in hand with such discussions. Whilst on track to post a circa 6.7m loss (i.e. nothing like the scaremongering figures rumoured amongst our fan base), we may at such point in time have a number of sellable assets (2 years from now), and a number of replacement assets on the academy production line, to create a fully sustainable business model.
Or, alternatively, our owners may bankroll this amount and see it as an “on-going investment” in playing staff (i.e. covering some of their wages), in order to reach the promised land, and by virtue, get a whole load of their money back. Either way, it is manageable and we are rapidly returning to financial health, which in turn, may well be attracting outside investment. I’ll post more on this related topic, if there is interest at a later date.
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